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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigates the significant influence of family 
ownership on firm performance in order to provide information to 
decision makers and other interested parties. The analysis includes 
comparisons between family and non-family firm performance in 
Indonesia. The samples are taken from 31 consumer goods 
companies, listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange, ranging from 
2005 to 2009. The results show that non-family firms perform 
better than family firms and no significant influence between 
family ownership and firms’ profitability. On the other hand, family 
ownership has negative contribution to firm market valuation. The 
study suggests that family firms have lower financial performance 
than that of non-family.  Family members within the top position 
have major control rights and contribute a negative influence to 
firm performance. The evidence raises concerns about possible 
profit manipulation and weak governance law in Indonesia, and as 
a result there is an expropriation of wealth to the majority and 
family related shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Family-controlled firm is a common and unique business 
organization and often raise particular questions concerning 
succession and governance. The common issue raised is 
relationships and succession between management, board 
members and family members (Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2004). Recent 
studies regarding ownership structure stated that a large number of 
listed companies in do not show a wide dispersed ownership 
structure. These types of companies generally have one or more 
dominant shareholders that can be classified as families, states, 
foreigners, or financial company (Isakov & Weisskopf, 2009). 
Some developed country such as United States found that family 
businesses can contribute 62% of Gross Domestic Product (Shanker 
& Astrachan, 1996), while in several European countries like France, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, the proportion 
of family business is very large (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003). In the 
case of Indonesia, family business contributes 82% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in which 90% of the listed companies are 
family firms  (Susanto, 2000). 
 
There are unique challenges that family business groups face, 
mainly concern with family dynamics and ownership. Negative 
perception often juxtaposed this term, since family business is 
considered as ineffective, collusive and unprofessional. Family 
firms are assumed to be more vulnerable between the company's 
interests with the interests of the family. Although not all positions 
in family firm are filled by family members at the top level, the 
company also employs other professional staffs. The majority 
voting rights owned by family members provide the rights to 
reject the minorities. In addition, according to Barclay and 
Holderness (1989) the high ownership shares by the family will 
reduce the ability to get investors from external parties and will 
reduce the market value of the company. 
 
Family firms are characterized by the founding family's concentrated 
ownership and the founding family members’ involvement in firms' 
management either as top executives or as directors.   Family 
ownership has both costs and benefits, but the positive effects of 
family ownership overcome the negative effects to the firm value.  
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The purpose of this study is to investigate company’s family 
ownerships and the impact to the company’s performance (Chu, 
2009). Furthermore, this paper will observe other non-family 
ownership factors such as government intervention, and other 
financial institution and foreign investments.  
 
Business and family are two aspects that are not easily combined. 
Although there are many negative outlooks about the existence of 
a family business, previous findings found family firms generate 
better performance than those of non-family. The main purpose of 
this study is to describe the characteristic of the family business 
in Indonesia and to compare between the family and non-family 
company’s performance. To support this purpose, the numbers of 
questions are raised: Is non-family business performance stronger 
than family business performance? And is there any significant 
influence of family business ownership to firm performance? 
 
The rest of the article is described as follows. The first section 
focusses on the theoretical and hypothesis development, the second 
section outlines the methodology underlying the research. The third 
section presents the data collection, the fourth section describes the 
empirical analysis and discussion. The last section concludes the 
findings with certain limitation. 
 
 
THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
Ownership structure is an important factor to determine the firm 
value. Ownership structure refers to the size of their holdings and the 
identities of a firm’s equity holders. Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami 
(2005) divides the shareholding patterns into two major dimensions; 
the size of ownership (majority and non-majority), and the identity of 
ownership (family and non-family ownership). Aspects such as 
number of stockholders, concentration of shares on minority 
shareholders, and the non-family stockholders, can affect succession 
planning and family involvement in the firm (Daily & Dollinger, 
1992).  
 
The problem raises when a firm ownership is concentrated, in which 
the typical case occurred in Western Europe and the most of Asia. 
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This type of company are different when firm ownership is dispersed, 
as is typically for firms in US, Japan, and UK. Conflicts of interest 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholder becomes a 
problem when the ownership is concentrated at one owner that has 
effective control of the firm, However, when ownership is diffused, 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders are a central 
problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
The first generation of a family firm tends to concentrate into one 
owner than that after several generations. During this phase, strategies 
may be designed and carried out according to the decision-making 
processes that centralize on the firm’s leader. On the other hand, 
family businesses with dispersed capital are more difficult to develop 
similar kind of leadership, and long-term strategic orientation might 
be designed through negotiation processes and agreements between 
family members and shareholders (Casillas, Acedo, & Moreno, 2007). 
Leach and Bogod (1999) argue that family business may differ in 
certain ways compared to the non-family ones. One of them is 
characteristic, which is shaped by its own set of typical personalities, 
concerns, objectives, and relationship. The characteristic of family 
business involves high involvement management such as decision 
making and policy business. The owner, which is one of the family 
members, influences every step of the progress and sometimes 
involves the heirs in business as soon as they start to work. 
 
Several studies support the development of the hypotheses which 
investigate relationships between concentrated ownership structure 
and firm value. In contrast, many studies failed to confirm a positive 
association between firm performance and ownership concentration. 
Arifin (2003) investigates listed firms in Indonesia and found that 
family-controlled firms have fewer agency problems than the 
publicly-controlled firms or firms without controlling shareholders. 
He suggests that the agency problems in family-owned firms are 
fewer as a cause of less conflict between the principal and agent. On 
the other hand, if there are minority interests in family-owned firms, 
there will be conflict of interests between majority (family) and 
minority ownership. 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) conducted a study on the relationship 
between family ownership structure to corporate performance using 
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panel data from companies in the S & P 500 index. They found that 
family firms have better performance compared to other companies, 
mainly in companies where the founder of the company is still 
actively become CEO of the company (founder effect). Another study 
conducted by Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (1998), found no 
relationship between corporate performance (as measured by Tobin's 
Q) with the percentage of management ownership. Along with rising 
interest from 0 to 5%, the company's performance also increased. In 
the range from 5% ownership further to 25%, decreased the 
company's performance. When the concentration of ownership is 
above 25%, the company's performance rises slowly. The percentage 
of management ownership between 0 to 5% formed alignment-interest 
effect that can increase company performance. While the percentage 
of ownership between 5% to 25% shows the entrenchment effect 
which occurs from management ownership that have a bad effect on 
performance. Ownership percentage above 25% could weaken the 
entrenchment effects occurred.  
 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) examined the same topic 
with a sample of 1,301 public companies from 8 countries in East 
Asia, including Indonesia. In their research, Indonesia is the only 
country that shows the effects of entrenchment and alignment with the 
same level of significance strong. The sample data of companies in 
Indonesia shows a positive relationship between ownership with the 
valuation. However, this sample also shows the relationship negative 
magnitude of the differences between ownership and control with a 
valuation on 1% significance level. 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine how family ownership, control 
and management within the company affect the value of the 
companies. They examined the companies listed in Fortune-500 on 
period 1994-2000, and find that ownership by the family increases 
value firms if the pioneers or inventors to be a CEO or a chairman 
with a hired CEO. However, when generation his successor as CEO, 
the value of the company declined. Their findings indicates that the 
owner-management conflicts in non-family firms spend more than the 
cost of the conflict between family and holder non-family shares in 
companies with pioneer or inventor became CEO. But nevertheless, 
conflicts between family shareholders non-family shares in the 
company where future generations into CEOs spend more than the 
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cost of the conflict between the owner-management in non-family 
firms. 
 
Based on the above literature, this paper attempts to develop two 
hypotheses.  
 
H1: Non-family business performance is stronger than family business 
performance. 
 
H2: There is significant influence of family concentrated ownership to 
firm performance. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
In order to answer the above, a model is prepared based on the 
supporting literatures. The variables included in the models contribute 
the determinant to which family and non-family enterprises influence 
company’s performances. As indicated in the literature, ownerships 
variables represent the main factors alongside controlling variables. 
 
Dependent Variables 
The application of the models employ two dependent variables to 
measure company performance, namely ROA and Tobin's Q. ROA 
is used to measure accounting performance of the company, while 
Tobin's Q will be used to measure market performance of the 
company. The use of market value than accounting-based measures 
of profitability has become extensive in empirical analyses of firm 
profitability (Hirsch & Seaks, 1993). Tobin’s Q is a forward-
looking measure that reflects the market’s valuation of firm’s assets 
relative to book value and sometimes used as a proxy for a firm’s 
future growth opportunities (King & Segal, 2008). The advantage of 
using Tobin’s q is that the difficult problem of estimating either 
rates of return or marginal costs can be avoided (Lindenberg & 
Ross, 1981). This study uses Tobin’s Q ratio as the ratio of total 
liabilities plus the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of total assets. The market value of equity is calculated by 
multiplying the number of outstanding shares of a company with 
its current market price. Due to the changing nature of these 
values, the author uses the closing stock prices on the last trading 
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day of years 2005-2009. A company's market value of equity is 
therefore always changing as these two input variables change. 
When the stock price of a company goes up consistently, overall 
market value of equity will goes up as well. The market value of 
equity of a company enables to analyse the degree to which the 
stock is available at expensive, cheap or fair valuations. A proxy 
of Tobin’s Q also used by Morck et al. (1998), Martínez, Stöhr, 
and Quiroga (2007), Andres (2008), Miller (2007), Villalonga &  
Amit (2006), Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2009), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Khanna and Palepu (2000). 
 
The other dependent variable to be employed is Return on Assets 
(ROA). ROA measures a company’s profits compared to its entire 
investment. ROA is a backward-looking measure that reflects 
accounting rules, and it is viewed as a measure of profitability or 
productivity (King & Segal, 2008). ROA as dependent variable 
also used in similar studies by Villalonga and Amit (2006), Isakov 
and Weisskopf (2009),  Adams et al. (2009), Andres (2008), Chu 
(2009), Martínez et al. (2007). 
 
Independent Variables 
First independent variable symbolized by Owner1 is a numerical 
measure, which indicates the percentage of equity owned by family 
founder or descendants, as an individual or organization. This 
number is derived from Laporan Kepemilikan Saham yearly and BEI 
Performance Summary for every company. This dummy variable 
also used by Chu (2009) in his study. Family Firm Dummy is a 
variable that classifying companies in the sample research into 
family firms and non-family firms. This variable will be worth 1 if a 
firm including in the category of family firms and will be 0 if 
included in category of non-family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Andres (2008), Martinez(2007), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Miller 
(2007), Isakov and Weisskopf (2009) construct this dummy 
variables in their model to differentiate between family and  non-
family firms. 
 
Control Variables 
The influence of firm age on the survival and growth of firms has 
long been developed in previous literature. According to Daily and 
Dollinger (1992) studies, the age of family and non-family firms 
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might be different because of different succession challenges. Firm 
Age is defined as the natural logarithm of company age since 
establishment of the company or the first year when the family 
founder take over, until the certain year (2005; 2009). This 
measurement is consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Andres (2008), and Chu (2009). 
 
According to Kole (1995), in the industrial organization literature, 
firm size reflects the existence of economies and diseconomies of 
scale and may form barriers to entry. Firm size can also influence 
the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. 
To avoid the extreme result value problem, firm size is 
controlled by using the natural logarithm of the five years average 
(2005-2009) firm’s total assets. 
 
The debt-equity ratio or leverage, measures the proportion of funds 
provided by creditors and stockholders using to finance its assets. 
High leverage generally means that a company has been 
aggressively financed its economic growth by debt. Isakov and 
Weisskopf (2009), Adams et al. (2009), Andres (2008) employ debt 
to equity ratio into their research model. 
 
The above variables formulate the two proposed models, as follows: 
 
  
 
where,  
 y : firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q (market       
performance) and ROA (accounting performance) 
Owner1  :    percentage of equity owned by family members 
Owner2 :  dummy variable, which combines the existence of family       
equity and the presence of family members on the top position 
in company (family=1 ; non-family=0)  
Size        :   natural logarithm of firm’s total assets 
Age   : natural logarithm since of the number years since the        
establishment of the firm 
Lev         :   ratio of total debt over total shareholder’s equity 
ε           :   an error term 
 
yit = β0 + β1 Owner1it + β2 Owner2 + β3Size it +β4 Age it +β5 Levit  + εit 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
As for data collection, the sample of this study will be divided into 
two groups: family firm and non-family firm. This study will use the 
criteria of a family company as used by Miller (2007) and Allouche, 
Amann, Jaussaud, and Kurashina (2008). The criterion consists of 
shares owned by at least 5% of certain families and less than 5%. 
The family member can have a position on the Board of Directors or 
Board of Commissioners of the company. This is also in accordance 
to regulation by Indonesian stock exchange, in that the minimum 
limit ownership by family is 5%. Thus, companies’ classification 
between family firms and non-family firms can be easily conducted 
because of availability data in BEI. Based on this criterion, there are 
19 family firms and 12 non-family firms in the consumer industry.  
 
Samples in this study include consumer goods firms in Indonesian 
listed companies during 2005 until 2009. Two consumer goods firms 
have to be excluded from all testing due to incomplete financial 
reports for a certain year or companies are inactively traded for a 
certain year. The firms which can be used for this study is 31 firms 
from 33 total consumer goods firms. These data are collected 
through Indonesia Stock Exchange Database, Indonesia Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD), and from company’s website. This 
research obtains secondary data which collect the annual report of 
Indonesia listed company that is provided freely. For further 
information to support the research process, the author also use IDX 
fact book, articles, journals, textbook, and magazine. 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Prior to descriptive analysis, a normality test is conducted to 
determine whether the data samples are normally distribution or 
not. By using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the provided sample data is 
not normally distributed and thus Spearman non-parametric test 
will be used for correlation analysis, presented in table 1 below.   
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Table 1. Spearman' Correlation and Multicollinearity 
 
Variables ROA Tobin's Q VIF 
Size 0.290** 0.238** 1.074 
Age 0.515** 0.396** 1.092 
Leverage -0.255** 0.084 1.012 
Owner 1 -0.110 -0.367** 1.650 
Owner 2 -0.235** -0.456** 1.689 
 
Table 1 illustrates correlation and multicollinearity tests between 
dependent and independent variables. Based from the table, most 
independent variables have significant correlation with the two 
dependent variables (significant level of 0.01). Only two variables, 
namely Owner 1 has less significant correlation with ROA, and 
Leverage with Tobin’s Q. Negative correlations occur between 
Tobin’s Q and Owner2 (-0.456) and Tobin’s Q and Owner1 (–
0.367). The result shows that the higher the family ownership in 
company, the lower the firm market performs., There is also 
negative correlation between ROA and leverage (-0.255), in that the 
more debt financed by shareholder’s equity, the lower the 
accounting profit generated from total assets. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for family and non-family 
ownerships in consumer goods industry. The table shows the 
average size for all samples is 27.5131. The average value of size 
(natural log of total asset) in family firms is slightly higher than 
non-family firms (27.5675>27.4270). In addition, the table shows 
various leverage mean (the proportion of total debt to total equity) 
for each of the groups. The full sample present a 1.5137 mean while 
the family firms’ leverage average is 1.0844 and non-family firms of 
2.5705. These results illustrate that family firms are presumed to 
have less debt than the non-family ones. The average of firm’s age 
for full sample, family and non-family are 0.4112, 3.5096 and 
3.6247, respectfully. This indicates that the age of firms do not 
provide significant differences despite the family firms are 
relatively younger than those of non-family. In terms of firm’s value 
measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA, the description shows that family 
firms has smaller values than non-family firms. The average value 
of ROA in non-family firms (13.39%) shows almost double than 
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family firms (6.85%). Market measures as indicated by Tobin’s Q 
shows that non-family firms have significantly greater valuation 
compared to family firms (3.5491>1.3151). 
 
In terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q means, the description finds the 
non-family firms have better performance than those of family firms. 
Additionally, high ROA firms are more profitable than low 
ROA firm. Firms with high ROA can grow faster than low ROA 
firms without borrowing or selling additional shares to raise capital. 
The finding is different with Allouche et al. (2008) who found that 
family listed firms in Japan perform better than non-family firms 
in terms of their ROA, ROE and ROIC. Moreover, the finding 
contradicts with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Martínez et al. 
(2007) which argue that family enterprises are superior than the non-
family ones. In terms of leverage, the mean for full sample is 1.6596 
while the leverage ratio for family and non-family are 1.0844 and 
2.5705 respectively. The results show that the family ownership 
uses less debt, compared with the non-family ones. This finding is 
also with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variables 
Full Sample 
(N=155)
Family 
(N=95)
Non-
Family
Mean Std Dev Mean Mean 
 
Size 
 
27.5131
 
1.5137
 
27.5675
 
27.427
Leverage 1.6596 9.9444 1.0844 2.5705 
Age 3.5542 0.4112 3.5096 3.6247 
ROA 0.0938 0.2109 0.0685 0.1339 
Tobin's Q 2.1798 4.2151 1.3151 3.5491 
 
Table 3 illustrates Panel A of ROA model. Based from the 
regression model, the adjusted R2 is 16.9% (0.169) which can be 
interpreted that this model enables to explain ROA by firm size, 
firm age, leverage, owner 1, and owner 2.  
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From Table 4 it can be concluded that 13.7% Tobin’s Q can be 
explained by firm size, firm age, leverage, owner 1, and owner2 
by looking at adjusted R-squared value. Two possible reasons, 
either the model is affected by multicollinearity or the presence of 
supporting variables that are not used in this research.  
 
Table 3. Panel A model – ROA 
 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistics
p-
value 
ROA -0.784 -2.688 0.008 
Size 0.006 0.549 0.584 
Age 0.209 5.315 0.000* 
Leverage 0.000 -0.133 0.894 
Owner1 -0.015 -0.232 0.817 
Owner2 -0.036 -0.885 0.377 
Adj R-Squared       0.169 
F-Statistic       7.261 
Prob (F-
Statistic) 
      0.000 
 
Table 4. Panel B model - Tobin's Q 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics p-value 
Tobin’s Q -10.887 -1.833 0.069 
Size 0.121 0.562 0.575 
Age 3.072 3.831 0.000* 
Leverage -0.011 -.348 0.729 
Owner1 0.214 0.166 0.869 
Owner2 -2.000 -2.383 0.018* 
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Variable Coefficient t-statistics p-value 
Adj R-Squared       0.137 
F-Statistic       5.892 
Prob (F-Statistic)       0.000 
 
Leverage variable is negatively correlated with ROA and Tobin’s 
Q but insignificant at p-value of 0.894 and 0.729. This result 
contradicts with Friend and Lang (1988) who argues debt-financing 
decision might have a negative impact on firm performance. 
High debt financing may outweigh the return a company generates 
on the debt through investment and other business activities. 
Moreover, Other researchers examine the effect of leverage to firm 
profit and make the conclusion about significantly negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage (Achmad, Rusmin, 
Neilson, & Tower, 2008). 
 
The firm age variable in all samples of the study is 3.55 and is not 
statistically different between family and non-family ownership in 
this sample. Even though there is no significant difference in age 
between family and non-family, family firms are younger than non-
family firms (3.51 versus 3.62) consistent with Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Ibrahim and Samad (2011). 
Based on the two panel regression analyses,  firm age as controlling 
variable generates significant contribution towards company’s 
performance. The more mature or well established the company is, 
the better the performance of the company, measured from its 
accounting profit (ROA), or by using market valuation (Tobin’s Q). 
A general assumption to this behaviour is  that  investors pressume 
to have positive perspective towards firms that enable t o  survive 
through economic fluctuation and market conditions. 
 
The percentage of total equity owned by family members 
represented by owner1 variable prove not to contribute any 
significant influence to firm’s performance, either distinguished by 
ROA or Tobin’s Q models. A possible reason is due to incomplete 
information and bias data in getting the exact amount of family 
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percentage ownerships. These results contradict with previous 
studies such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Boubakri et al. 
(2005) which suggest the concentration of family shareholders is 
significantly and positively related to firm performance. 
 
The other variable, Owner 2 dummy variable to return on assets, is 
negatively insignificant to firm performance. This finding is 
inconsistent with Demsetz and Lehn (1985),  results. On the other 
hand, this result consistent to several previous studies, which found 
that family control, is not related to firm performance 
(Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). Related to the  Tobin’s Q 
model, Owner2 variable is significantly influencing market firm 
performance with p-value of  0.018 (p < 0.005). Tobin’s Q is 
measured by market value of equity over book value of assets. 
Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the company's 
current stock price by its number of outstanding shares. A 
company's market value of equity is therefore always changing as 
these two input variables react. When the stock price of a company 
goes up consistently, overall market value of equity will goes up as 
well. Market value of equity of a company can help us analyze 
whether the stock is available at expensive, cheap or fair valuations. 
Specifically, this study found that 1% change in family ownership 
is approximately associated with a decline of 200% in market 
value performance. This result means that family ownership 
concentration in firm give highly negative impact to its market 
valuation. 
 
Recent research found various confiscation of minority 
shareholders across nations which are influenced by legal and 
regulatory institution (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Maury (2006) suggests benefits from 
family ownership fade with higher level of controls. Market 
valuation measured by Tobin’s Q is predicted to become higher for 
firms with low family control, which can be interpreted as a sign 
to increase family opportunism and extraction of private benefits. 
Moreover, the  profitability increases with family control level 
which shows that family management improves the efficiency of 
a company but that minority shareholders cannot really profit from it. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Family firms’ performance in Indonesia is concluded to have lower 
compared to non-family firms’ performance by looking from its 
accounting profitability and market valuation. Therefore, this 
evidence further confirms that family firms tend to invest high shares 
with lower risks and lower returns. Furthermore, family ownerships 
concerns with family interest and the survival of the firms as family 
firms tend to be risk averse (Rahman, 2005). The other reasonable 
explanation is because family firms in Indonesia are not purely a 
family organization. Most family business in Indonesia is controlled 
under foundation or ‘yayasan’ which easily occurs various acts of 
corruption and collusion.  
 
In regard to the role of concentrated family ownership and control 
in large firms in eight Asian countries, Jiang and Peng (2011) found 
that family ownership itself does not show significant effect on 
firm performance in some countries. On the contrary, this study 
found that in less-developed and more of corruption countries 
such as Indonesia tend to have more opportunities to expropriate 
minority shareholders. 
 
There are several possible reasons with regard to negative impacts 
arising from the family ownership structures to firm performance. 
One of the problems is due to entrenchment issues surrounding the 
management in most of the family business in Indonesia. 
Entrenchment problem, which involve family owners and other 
members, may jeopardise corporate governance and control, and thus 
can detriment company performance. The domination of family 
control the company and the composition of the board of directors and 
management of family-controlled are some of the overt factors. 
According to Morck et al. (1998), the entrenchment issues are likely 
to increase whenever there is a dominant role of clan in recruiting 
directors and commissioners. In sum, the tendency to select their 
family members to manage in company which ownership is controlled 
by themselves (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
 
Another possible factor is that there may be weak legal issues in 
Indonesia’s minority shareholders.  As a result, the majority of 
shareholders may acquire some of the rights of minority shareholders. 
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Additionally, there is a possibility to increase their wealth to the 
majority and family shareholders while disadvantaging the minority 
and non-family shareholders (Achmad et al., 2008). 
 
Some limitation encountered during the research process. This study 
does not differentiate types of family ownerships such as parents, 
sibling partnerships, which can be an important factors to determine the 
effect to company performance. Other limitation relating to application 
of purposive sample design in which the sample is limited to 
consumer goods industry. This sample selection may limit the 
generalisibility of the result which may not be applicable for other 
industries in Indonesia. 
 
Several recommendations are purposed to further research. Firstly, 
one can extend the investigation to other emerging sampling design 
and expand time horizon. Further research can cover more sample 
periods to more than five years and the use all listed public firms 
from seven different industries as sample data in order to gain 
more relevance findings on the family business performance. This 
enables to generate better model in further research. Secondly, as this 
study only includes leverage, firm age, and firm size as the 
control variables, f uture research may incorporate debt in capital 
structure, industry classification, duality, growth into the research 
model (Villalonga and Amit,2006, Adams et al. (2009). 
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